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Abstract—The object of this work is to provide an extended 
analysis of the secure routing algorithm proposed in “Baruch 
Awerbuch et al. – Provably Secure Competitive Routing against 
Proactive Byzantine Adversaries via Reinforcement Learning”  - 
Technical Report, Computer Science Department – Johns 
Hopkins University, May 3003. The study is intended to 
constitute itself in a technical specification for a subsequent 
software implementation in ns-2 network simulator. The authors 
propose a new approach for the challenging problem of secure 
routing  in ad hoc networks. Inspired by other uses of “Swarm 
intelligence” and “Distributed Reinforcement Learning” 
paradigms in developing routing algorithms for fixed networks 
the authors develop a scheme intended to operate in dynamic 
setting and even more, under extremely strong adversarial 
environment. A Byzantine adversary is defined as an 
authenticated intermediate node acting alone or in collusion with 
other nodes in order to generate disruption or degradation of the 
routing service. The basic idea of the routing protocol is to 
combine a probabilistic source routing scheme with a feedback 
mechanism implemented by probing the behavior of 
intermediate nodes and links using authenticated 
acknowledgment of forwarded data packets. Probability 
distributions per outgoing edges, used by source node when 
computing the source route, are adjusted periodically, penalizing 
the observed failure of intermediate links to forward the packets. 
Therefore well performing links are selected with higher 
probabilities to route source initiated traffic. Each node 
maintains its own view of the network as a graph with routes 
toward all the other nodes. A source routes is extracted for each 
data packet from the originator’s graph and the packet is sent 
along that route. Authentication of the intermediate nodes is 
performed by an “onion encryption” scheme. Key material may 
be provided by classical methods using a PKI and shared keys 
established on-demand or some other methods. 
 
Index Terms—MANET, Byzantine adversary, onion 
encryption, randomized source routing. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  mobile ad hoc wireless network (MANET) is a 
collection of mobile computers or devices that 
communicate with each other by wireless links in a 
cooperative manner without using any infrastructure like base 
stations or access points. Any node may act as a router to 
forward messages between other nodes that are not within 
direct wireless communication range. 
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Dynamically changing topology and variability of the 
wireless link quality plus the shared access to the limited 
bandwidth wireless channel raises additional constraints for 
designing efficient routing protocols compared with the static 
network environment. 
The security issues are even more acute because of the 
cooperative nature assumed for communication and because 
of the ease of access to the communication medium for the 
adversaries. Classical routing protocols are vulnerable to 
simple forms of attack like advertisement of false routing 
information, modification of various fields in control packets 
with effects like redirection of traffic routes or routing packets 
in a loop. Authentication of control packets is the solution for 
annihilating these tentative actions of disturbing the routing 
performance. Another complementary line of defense is 
monitoring the correct behavior of the routing agents by 
deployment of a distributed intrusion detection system of 
trusted servers. 
But there are more sophisticated attacks not addressed by 
these approaches. A first example of more sophisticated attack 
is a form of denial of service mounted by a compromised node 
that behaves well from the standpoint of the routing protocol 
and becomes part of a preferred route.  When the data packets 
reach the compromised node it drops them all or partially, 
affecting the forwarding stage of the routing process. This 
kind of opponent node is called “black hole” or “gray hole”. 
Even secure extensions of typical routing protocols, like 
Ariadne for DSR or SEAD for DSDV are vulnerable to this 
kind of attack (Ariadne and SEAD are described in [5] and 
[6]). A method to alleviate this situation for source routing 
case is the introduction of a random mechanism at source 
node to choose among more paths toward the same destination 
that makes the route with the intrusive node less probable to 
be selected. A refinement of this idea is, in fact, used by the 
protocol analyzed in the current project. But even more 
sophisticated forms of attack can be imagined if we consider a 
smart adversary which may adapt his disrupting behavior by 
monitoring the visible traffic for him. Such a node, which acts 
as an authenticated one, but can any time generate disruption 
or degradation of the routing service is called Byzantine 
adversary. As a superior form of attack we can mention 
colluding Byzantine adversaries or a completely arbitrary 
strong adversarial environment.  
We can even formulate a routing problem in the following 
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extreme situation. If there is connectivity between two nodes 
in our network and we need data to be exchanged by them 
then we would like to develop a scheme that in an effective 
manner, with some controllable costs, eventually larger delay,  
is able to identify that good path and use it. And even more, if 
the path degrades during data forwarding because of an 
adversary action or some other reasons, our scheme should 
contain adaptive mechanisms to notice this and find another 
path. 
Here comes one of the main points of the algorithm. That is 
to imitate the behavior of ants when they explore new 
territories looking for food. They leave a trail of pheromone 
when using a route, which evaporates with time, but the 
amount of pheromone is increasing with the frequency of 
traversal of the marked location. A later coming ant selects its 
way at each “intersection” based on the local pheromone 
distribution. 
A similar approach, which may be called randomized “ant 
routing”, is easy now to be sketched for routing data packets 
in an ad hoc network. Each data packet is an “ant” so we do 
not use dedicated control packets to discover or advertise 
routing information. But we still need a method to acquire 
needed information about the changing topology and link 
availability in our network. Agents of a distributed routing 
process executing at each node are “learning” and using fault-
free paths in the network. A probability distribution of a so-
called “non-faultiness” is maintained for the node’s adjacent 
links. This distribution expresses in a relative manner among 
all the adjacent links their observed good behavior in 
forwarding data packets in the recent past. When a new route 
is computed, the next hop is chosen among neighbors in a 
random manner but with better performing links selected more 
frequently as they have larger values of “non-faultiness” 
associated.  The link (non)faultiness is adjusted based on 
special acknowledgment packets issued by destination and/or 
intermediate nodes to confirm the successfully 
received/forwarded data packets. These acknowledgment 
packets represent, of course, control overhead and this is the 
price paid for implementing this scheme.  
The scheme, once extended with an encryption mechanism, 
which is going to protect the routing information stored in 
data and ack packets, will prove to be extremely robust and 
effective to forward packets in strong adversarial setting. The 
mechanism used for implementing the required confidentiality 
is called “onion encryption” and is borrowed from related 
work on securing communication protocols in static networks. 
The last thing to be mentioned as an important feature 
before getting into detailed description of the algorithm is that 
all the information about the network connectivity is derived 
at the source node by processing periodically the collected 
acks for originated data packets during an appropriate time 
interval. In this way the source node is capable to maintain its 
own view about the network in a dynamically updated graph 
structure, which is then used to generate the source route 
toward the desired destination. So in essence we are dealing 
with a probabilistic source routing algorithm made strongly 
resilient to adversarial behavior of intermediate nodes by an 
incorporated encryption mechanism.  
 
II.  PROBLEM DEFINITION AND MODEL  
The routing protocol operation relies on some basic network 
assumptions. The security model describes cryptographic 
primitives used, the trust relationships assumed between 
parties and introduces a classification of possible attacks and 
adversaries  
A.  Network Model 
Because the protocol uses the forwarding path also in 
reverse order, to propagate back to the source node the 
acknowledgment for the issued data packet, the 
communication links need to be bi-directional. This is not an 
important restriction as, in ad hoc networks, many other 
routing protocols have this requirement and most of the data 
link protocols implement their functionality based on this 
feature. 802.11 is the classical example of a wireless MAC 
protocol incorporating bi-directional links. 
No knowledge of the actual topology is shared between the 
nodes. Each node develops and maintains its own view about 
the network based on authenticated feedback it receives from 
the other nodes when its own traffic travels through the 
network toward the destination. The only related assumption 
is that all the constituent nodes know the potential 
“membership” of the network. That is again a usual 
assumption for a secure routing protocol where credentials 
must be associated with some known identities for the 
participants. A node joining later the network floods its 
authenticated identity throughout it. 
Only security threats at the network layer are considered. 
Attacks to lower layers are not specifically addressed. 
Physical layer attacks like jamming, or MAC layer ones, like 
special RTS/CTS frames are ignored. However, as in any 
other case, here also the routing protocol is assumed to be able 
to overcome such attacks as they can be seen as simple 
instances of broken links.  
B.  Security Model 
1)  Security Assumptions 
Symmetric cryptographic primitives are used for 
authentication and encryption. Any two nodes in the network 
share a secret key. The keys may be established before the 
deployment of the network or after that, on demand, using a 
suitable public key infrastructure for the special context of ad 
hoc networks.  The public key infrastructure can be either 
completely distributed (“terminodes” approach – presented in 
[12]) or Certificate Authority (CA) based. In CA based 
approach, a distributed cluster of peer CAs sharing a common 
certificate and revocation list can be deployed to improve the 
CA’s availability. 
No trusted parties are assumed. Only the source and 
destination are considered to be trusted. Any intermediate 
node on the path between source and destination can be  
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authenticated and can participate in the protocol. Nodes that 
cannot be authenticated are ignored by the protocol. The 
protocol is claiming to operate even with compromised 
authenticated nodes because beside authentication the source 
node can check the good forwarding behavior of the 
intermediate node by a special probing method. 
2)  Considered Attacks  
Byzantine behavior of an authenticated intermediate node is 
defined as any action that results in disruption or degradation 
of the routing service. A Byzantine node may act either alone 
or in collusion with other nodes.  
Defining a fault as any disruption that causes significant 
loss or delay in the network we notice that Byzantine behavior 
is a possible cause of a fault. Other causes are simple external 
adversaries, lower layer errors, network congestion or 
mobility effects.  
Various  simple attacks are addressed by the protocol: 
interception, modification or fabrication of packets; creation 
of routing loops, dropping packets completely (“black hole” 
adversary) or selectively (“gray hole” adversary); artificially 
delay of packets; routing packets on changed routes. The 
overall effect of all mentioned attacks is disruption or 
degradation of the routing service plus excessive resource 
consumption. Resource consumption is a delicate problem in 
ad hoc networks as the nodes use limited memory and 
processor power. In the same time the power provided by 
battery is a scarce resource. 
The wormhole attack (introduced in [5]) is also addressed 
in the sense that bad behavior of the wormhole link is detected 
and the link gets avoided. 
3)  Classes of Adversaries 
Adversaries can be classified on three dimensions. On each 
dimension we can rank them by their power. The algorithm 
claims that even the “strongest” of behavior in each dimension 
is addressed. 
a)  Malignancy of the attacks 
A benign adversary adversary can only drop packets, 
exercise denial of service but cannot engage in active attacks 
like modifying routes or messages. 
Static malicious adversaries form next class in the 
adversary hierarchy. In this case an adversary can permanently 
control a static set of intermediate nodes and mount from there 
attacks like: 
-  Libel: assigning blame to other nodes for failure to 
transmit or receive packets 
-  Impersonation: pretending to be another node 
-  Mis-routing: sending messages in wrong directions 
-  Topology-distortion: incorrectly advertising topology 
information to draw traffic into itself 
-  Ack-distortion: attempting to send fake 
acknowledgments 
Proactive malicious adversaries populate the third class. 
They can take control of different routers at different times, 
even if these routers have previously been authenticated. 
b)  Collusion power of adversary 
First case is no collusion, when the opponent acts alone. 
The extreme case is complete collusion, when all adversaries 
group in a team and mount complex attacks as “tunneling” or 
“wormhole” attacks, as well as “switching blame” between 
them to avoid detection.  
c)  Adaptivity/Intelligence of the adversary 
The simplest case is that of a completely static adversary. 
He knows the details of the algorithm but uses only static 
patterns of attack, mounting only relative simple attacks. 
Oblivious dynamic adversary uses the full knowledge of the 
routing algorithm to adapt his attack. Collecting statistics on 
traffic he may choose next action to determine disruption of 
most efficient routes, causing increased damage on routing 
service. 
Adaptive adversary maintains history of his past decisions 
and of the routing algorithm “flip coins” (powerful routing 
algorithms use randomness in clever ways to minimize the 
effects of sophisticated attacks) and uses them to adapt his 
attack on the current and estimated status of the routing 
service. 
C.  Problem Definition 
The goal of the original work is to provide a robust on-
demand secure probabilistic source routing algorithm that is 
resilient to byzantine adversaries with arbitrary strong 
behavior as described above. A detailed analysis beyond the 
content of the original paper is performed in this study in 
order to sketch a technical specification for a later software 
implementation in ns-2 network simulator.  
III.  SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL 
The main components of the routing protocol are detailed 
below, including pseudocode procedures: 
A.  Initial setup 
1)  Transforming the topological graph of the network 
into an acyclic directed layered graph 
The routing protocol uses, in essence, a source routing 
scheme. When the source has a data packet to be sent to a 
destination, it uses its internal representation of the network to 
generate the path to be followed by the packet through the 
network toward that destination. The internal representation is 
a directed graph having weights associated with each link.  
A setup procedure is necessary to initialize the internal 
graph of each node. In a static scenario or for fixed networks 
when the topology of the communication network is known 
this step results in a simpler acyclic directed layered graph. 
The algorithm can be started, otherwise, assuming full 
interconnection of the original communication network. We 
remember one of the network assumptions, that each node 
knows the “membership” of the network. This is actually all 
we need to initialize the graph structure. Another assumption 
that we make now about communication is that all the nodes 
can potentially reach an intended receiver in no more that H  
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hops. This is a usual assumption in real networks to limit the 
travel time of a packet toward its destination in case a wrong 
route is followed. The formal procedure to obtain a directed 
layered acyclic graph, G
’(V
’, E
’) from the undirected original 
graph,  G(V, E), describing the topology/membership of the 
communication network, is as follows: 
We start from sink node r and stop at level H. 
 V
’
0 ← r0
  repeat j=0 to H-1 
  V
’
j+1 ← {vj+1| ∃ uj∈V
’
j
  ,(v, u)∈ Ε } 
  E
’
j+1 ← {vj+1 → uj | ∃ uj∈V
’
j
  ,(v, u)∈ Ε } 
remove all edges/vertices unreachable from sH 
Notice that subscript is used to denote the level and the 
same node in the original graph appears in each level but with 
a different subscript. For clarity, nodes on the layered graph 
will be called vertices and the links will be called edges. A 
source vertex has only outgoing edges and a sink vertex only 
incoming edges. Although not mentioned explicitly we 
consider self loops for each node as being part of the original 
graph. In this way the procedure generates the intended 
layered graph. We omitted this detail for simplicity but the 
implementation has to take it into account.  For example, 
applying the algorithm for an original network of 5 nodes, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We get the following layered acyclic directed graph: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2)  Starting probability distribution 
Next operation is to initialize the resulted graph with some 
arbitrary weights that must take the form of a probability 
distribution. Although the exact starting values may not be 
important, they have to satisfy some special conditions 
necessary for generating random paths. Weights of the 
outgoing edges of any vertex should add up to 1 and 
summation of weights of all paths between source and sink 
should be also 1. Details about these conditions are provided 
in a later section. Routing procedure will update them 
according with the feedback received from the network.  
B.  Source route generation 
1)  Generation of a discrete random variable 
We choose the Inverse Transform Method (see [13]) to 
generate a discrete random variable X having a given 
probability distribution P{X=xj}=pj, j=1,2, …, N, Σjpj=1. Here 
the values pj are the weights of the outgoing edges with the 
meaning of probability that edge j is selected when the source 
route is generated. The cited routine assumes the existence of 
a library function for generation of a uniformly distributed 
continuous random variable over interval (0,1). 
2)  Path generation algorithm 
Consider we have the data packet with a known destination, 
r, generated by the upper layers on the source node, s. 
On the layered graph of node s we start from vertex sH and 
select randomly each next hop, successively, until we reach 
the sink r0. For each chosen vertex, vi , we use the probability 
distribution of its outgoing edges, pij ,to generate  its next hop. 
A post-processing stage is performed to eliminate any cycle 
and to retain a loop-free version of the last part of the route 
from an si vertex to the sink. The pseudocode for that is: 
 a   b 
 s   
  repeat i=H downto 1 
    select nh of vi according to distribution pij 
 r   c    v i ← nh 
eliminate cycles
 
C.  Securing Routing Operation 
A complete delivery of a data packet is performed in two 
phases. The data packet is forwarded to the destination and an 
acknowledgement packet (ack) is sent back from destination 
to the source. Each node along the path makes specific action 
during these two phases. The burden of the operations is given 
by the cryptographic processing. 
1)  Forwarding phase 
a)  Forwarding at source 
The data packet is prepared by appending the source route 
generated above and two control fields: a unique identifier, id, 
incremented for each new packet sent, and a hop count hc, 
equal with the length of the path. The hop count field will be 
decremented by each intermediate node at reception of the 
packet. The main operation at the source is, however, the 
encryption of the path to protect it from being acquired by 
adversaries. The source anticipates what each of the 
intermediate nodes requires when performing its delivery 
function and encrypts only this information using the secret 
key shared with that node. More specific, an intermediate 
node needs to know only the next hop and the previous node. 
Each intermediate node  will us hop count field to estimate the 
s1
c
1
r0 r0
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4
s2
a3 a2
c2
b2
3  0 2  1  4  
 
5
timeout for a  timer started at forwarding moment and waiting 
for a later ack to come back. An “onion encrypted” path is 
computed by the source as follows:  
 
  
 
… 
 
... 
 
 
A timer associated with the packet id is started by the source 
in order to monitor the reception of an ack from the 
destination in an expected interval of time. The time interval 
of the timer is in direct relation with the path length that 
determines roughly the roundtrip time. Finally the data packet 
is sent to the first node in the path. 
b)  Forwarding on an intermediate node 
Each intermediate node receives the packet, authenticates it, 
decrypts the path and extracts the content addressed to him. 
The extracted portion consists of the previous node and the 
next hop.  
 
 
 
 
Then it starts a local timer associated with this packet, 
uniquely identified by the source address and its id. Previous 
node is also stored within timer data structure in order to 
propagate back toward the source the expected ack packet 
from the destination.  The data packet, with the remaining 
encrypted path and with the hop count field decremented by 
one, is forwarded to the next hop.  
c)  Reception at destination 
When the data packet reaches destination, the routing agent 
running here authenticates it, decrypts the path and extracts 
the previous node address: 
sr sr K L K MAC r n E data id s ), , ( , , 0 , , 1 −  
This, in our case nL-1, will be the first hop for the ack 
packet, which is constructed and sent toward the source 
immediately after reception.  
2)  Acknowledgment phase 
a)  Acknowledgment at destination 
The format of the acknowledgement prepared by the 
destination is as follows: 
sr K MAC r id s ack , , , ,   
r nL ← −1  
A MAC computed with the key shared between source and 
destination is attached for authentication at source. The id 
field identifies uniquely this ack with the data packet 
confirmed. 
b)  Acknowledgment on an intermediate node 
An intermediate node receives the ack, checks the source and 
id, identifies the timer for this expected ack and finds in this 
way the next hop for this ack. Then encrypts the received ack 
with its key shared with the source, prepares its own ack, 
computes a MAC with the key shared with source for a 
payload concatenated as below and sends this “onion 
encrypted” ack to the next hop. 
> < data
i sn i sn i sn i sn K K K i K i MAC MAC E n id s ack E n id s ack ), (...), , , , , ( , , , ,
1 1 1
+ + +
If the intermediate node does not receive the expected ack 
until the associated timer expires then it prepares its own ack 
and sends it to the appropriate next hop, taken from timer data 
structure: 
i sn K i MAC n id s ack , , , ,  
i i n n ← −1  
c)  Acknowledgment at source 
The source receives the “onion encrypted” ack and 
authenticates then decrypts the successive nested acks until 
eventually reaches the last node: 
1 n s ←  
i sn sn K K MAC E n id s ack (...), , , , ,
1 1  
 If that last node is not the expected destination, all the links in 
the original source route for that packet are penalized.  When 
the timer for a sent data expires on the source itself, all the 
links of the monitored source path are penalized. A buffer 
with all this penalties is maintained and used later for link 
weight updates. 
D.  Link weight management 
The   routing agent runs periodically a transformation on the 
weighted graph structure to obtain an updated version. The 
buffer accumulated above during the last update period is used 
as input to this transformation, called “Weight Pushing”. The 
weights are maintained in the form of a probability 
distribution that ranks, relatively, good and bad behavior of 
the links involved in traffic forwarding. In this way when 
source route is generated the next hop is chosen randomly, 
according with the maintained probability distribution. 
1)  Computation of the Link Weight Updates 
The buffer with the accumulated paths acknowledged or 
expired during the last update interval is processed as follows: 
-  a probe counter is incremented for each encountered 
link: pc(e) 
-  a faultiness counter is incremented for any link not 
acknowledged: fc(e) 
-  Each edge vj+1 → uj in the directed graph receives an 
update be from the associated real link e=(v, u): 
) (
) (
e pc
e fc
e b β =  
where β is a constant between 0 and 1. Its magnitude 
determines the “responsiveness” of the penalizing scheme. An 
optimum value should be identified for b as a parameter. An 
adaptive online mechanism may be the best solution. We can 
interpret be as a “loss” update because when fc(e)is 0, meaning 
r , s ,
L → → → → −1 2 1 L s → r n n n
sr sr K L K MAC r n E data id s ), , ( , , 0 , , 1 −
i K sn i sn i sn i sn K K i i K MAC MAC E n n E data i L id s ), (...), , , ( , , , ,
1 1 1 1
+ + + − −
1 2 2 1 ), (...), , , ( , , , , 2 sn sn sn sn K K K K MAC MAC E n s E data L id s
i sn i sn i sn i sn K K K i i K MAC MAC E n n E data i L id s ), (...), , , ( , , , ,
1 1 1 1
+ + + − −
i i n → −1 n 
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that all instances of the link behaved well,  be is   is maximum, 
1, and when all instances of the link had bad behavior, fc(e)= 
pc(e) and be is minimum, be= β. 
 
2)  Update of the Probability Distribution 
The formal specification of the Weight Pushing algorithm is 
adapted from  [2]. Let G(V, E) be our weighted directed graph 
with a source vertex, s, and a sink vertex, r ( s has only 
outgoing edges, r – only incoming edges). Each edge, e, has 
an associated positive weight, we. For a vertex u in G we 
denote  P(u) the set of all paths from u to sink r. Also we 
extend the weights to paths, that is for a path P we define its 
weight as the product of the component edges’ weights: 
wP=Πe∈P we. We are interested that the weights to satisfy the 
following properties:  
1.  The outflow for each vertex u should be one: 
Σe∈O(u)we=1.  
2.  The total path weight is one: ΣP∈P(s) wP=1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These two properties allow the interpretation of weights as 
probabilistic values and make generation of random paths 
trivial. 
Now assume that each received factor be updates 
multiplicatively the weight of edge e. The properties specified 
above are lost in the general case but we are interested in a 
method to recover them and, in the same time, to incorporate 
the information acquired by reception of the updates. In the 
general case of directed graphs we may encounter 
computational difficulties because of the allowed cycles or 
self loops, which make possible infinite paths. To avoid this 
problem we consider the case of an acyclic directed graph, 
sufficient enough for our purposes. Weight Pushing algorithm 
defines for this case a so-called “kernel” value for each vertex 
in a recursive manner, starting from sink: 
Kr(w, b)=1; Ku(w, b)= Σe=(u,v):v∈O(u) webeKv(w, b) 
Then it computes the new weight for each edge e as being: 
  we ← webeKv(w, b)/ Ku(w, b) where e=(u, v). 
It is easy to check that both properties 1. and 2. mentioned 
above are recovered in this way (see [2] for details). 
  Finally, we closed the loop and obtained an updated version 
of the weights, which includes fresh information about the 
behavior of the links in the network. This version is now used 
to generate better source routes for future data packets. 
 
IV.  PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
ASSESSMENT 
The routing protocol presented above raises some questions 
related with its performance in terms of routing efficiency and 
security.  
We have no idea about the convergence of the scheme. An 
obvious price paid is that the data packets sent along an 
invalid route will be lost. The transport layer is responsible to 
recover from this situation by retransmission. The real 
problem is that the protocol does not trigger a fast mechanism 
to discover a valid route as most routing protocols do, by 
flooding the network with special route request packets. It is 
the case of DSR and AODV routing protocols, with their 
secure versions, Ariadne and ARAN or S-AODV ([5], [6], [8], 
[9]). The protocol just chooses randomly a new path, which 
may be with a higher probability the same invalid path. Only 
after the reaction of the source timer the probabilities are 
updated and better routes became, for sure, available. So, we 
have good reasons to consider that the scheme may be slow. 
This may become even more problematic in a highly dynamic 
mobile network.  The countermeasure would be to reduce the 
update period, and, at limit, we can arrange the protocol to 
perform the update for each new event, either a received ack 
or a timer expiration on source. But that increases of course 
the computation burden for the processor on source. To repeat 
all the computation required by Weight Pushing algorithm 
may become prohibitive. Even more, the amount of 
computation can increase, hopefully, polynomially with not a 
high degree and not exponentially, with the number of nodes 
in the network. We may guess that the scheme is not so 
scalable. A compromise between these two aspects seems to 
be an optimum solution. 
In terms of implementation a large amount of memory is 
easily guessed to be required, as we have to maintain directed 
weighted graph instances for each possible destination. This is 
our understanding about the scheme at this moment and a 
variant that may aggregate all these structure would be highly 
preferred. Development of all the data structures and 
procedures of the routing protocol may necessitate important 
programming effort.  
From the security point of view the scheme stands solid in 
front of us as a very robust one. Minimum amount of 
information is made available to any intermediate node. In 
case the intermediate node is an adversary the only options it 
has are either to drop the initial data packet or to ignore the 
subsequent ack. Nothing like an adaptive attack can be 
mounted, as it does not know details about the destination, 
next hops or previous nodes in the route, except its neighbors. 
Even for the information received from an intermediate node, 
which may be compromised, the source does more than a 
simple authentication.  
We may see the ack feedback from the intermediate node as a 
response to a “challenge” posed by the source node personally 
to that node. Source assumption about the connectivity 
s
r
s s
s
0 1  2  3  4 
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captured in the source issued route, which is, for sure, not 
forged, gets confirmed or infirmed by the acknowledgment 
mechanism. In this way false information from compromised 
nodes is avoided and the only things an opponent can do, as 
mentioned, either dropping the data packet or not propagating 
back the acknowledgment. But this kind of action will be 
detected, as the source will not receive ack from the next 
hops. Again, there is a price to be paid, and this is in the form 
of an important cryptographic overhead. A lot of encryptions, 
decryptions and authentication operations have to be 
performed during routing operation by each involved node. 
Unfortunately this is a basic defining feature of the algorithm 
and a way to alleviate is questionable to exist.   
    
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We consider that further analysis on computational 
complexity involved by this scheme can decide on its 
feasibility. Careful simulation can provide good answers about 
its actual performance and potential of improvement. The 
original paper has some other noteworthy aspects waiting for 
our analysis. Good part of this work reproduces the referred 
articles but this is to provide the support for our study. The 
effort in this work was especially in detailing the operation of 
the protocol and sketching the underlying routines and data 
structures. That allowed a better understanding of the original 
approach and was a very challenging experience. Some steps 
have been performed toward a possible implementation in a 
simulation environment.  
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